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Abstract
We examine whether investors herd in their decision to order or scrap vessels in the
drybulk market. We decompose herding into unintentional and intentional, and test
for herd behavior under asymmetric effects with respect to freight market states, cycle
phases, risk-return and valuation profiles, and ownership of the vessel. We detect un-
intentional herd behavior during down freight markets and contractions. Furthermore,
we find evidence of spill-over unintentional herding effects from the newbuilding to the
scrap market. Finally, asymmetric herd effects are evident between traditional and
liberal philosophy towards the ownership of the vessel, and during extreme risk-return
and valuation periods.
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1 Introduction
Shipping investment for newbuildings is mainly categorized into replacement, expansion-
ary and new entrance investment. Replacement shipping investment involves the allocation
of capital for the purposes of replacing vessels that are no longer capable of fulfilling the
company’s requirements and are, therefore, available for demolition. Major reasons for re-
placement realized through the newbuilding market include technical obsolescence, market
conditions, international regulations, and company policy. Next, expansionary shipping
investment constitutes capital outlay for materializing the growth strategy of shipping com-
panies in response to prevailing or expected market conditions that are usually accompanied
by availability of ship finance sources. Lastly, new entrance shipping investment involves the
injection of capital into newbuilding acquisitions by newcomers to the industry. The deci-
sion to expand fleet capacity is mainly linked to freight market conditions (Engelen et al.,
2006; Adland and Strandenes, 2007; Stopford, 2009; Greenwood and Hanson, 2015; among
others) as companies expand to maintain or increase their market share. Secondhand prices
and their relation to newbuilding prices (Merikas et al., 2008; Stopford, 2009) also constitute
a major influence in the decision to order new vessels due to construction lags (Kalouptsidi,
2014), as shipping investors may demand immediate delivery of vessels when freight rates
are at high levels. On the other hand, scrapping a vessel is a major decision that irreversibly
disposes a capital-intensive asset, while certain vessel features – age, technical obsolescence
and condition –, international regulations and the market state will influence the likelihood
of a vessel being sent for demolition. Generally, for older and poor condition1 vessels, em-
ployment potential and scope for capital appreciation are limited, thus, leading to higher
scrapping levels. In addition to vessel age and deteriorating condition, technical obsoles-
cence is also likely to result in reduced running cost efficiency, greater maintenance and crew
costs, and higher insurance premia; therefore, drive vessels to the scrapyard. Furthermore,
vessel retirement taking place due to regulatory changes is a compulsory decision. In terms
of market state, if freight conditions are such that it is not economically feasible to oper-
ate vessels, then shipping investors are faced with the decision to continue operations at a
loss, lay-up or scrap the vessel. Operating at a loss and lay-up are reversible options with
expectations as to future profitability playing an important role. In contrast, scrapping is
an irreversible decision that shipping investors have traditionally preferred to avoid, even
during severe oversupply conditions when outstanding debt obligations and equity base de-
pletion are further obstacles. The decision to scrap vessels is linked to the prevailing freight,
secondhand and scrap market conditions. Buxton (1991) argues that there is little economic
sense in operating a vessel or selling her in the sale-and-purchase market when both markets
have deteriorated significantly. Knapp et al. (2008) confirm the hypothesis of an inverse
relation between vessel earnings and the probability of a ship being scrapped, establish a
positive relation between scrap prices and scrapping probability, and find no significant rela-
tion between flag, ownership or safety factors and scrapping. Recently, Alizadeh et al. (2016)
examine the capacity retirement in the drybulk market by employing a combination of vessel
specific and market variables. The study confirms the previously established negative associ-
ation between earnings and scrapping, and the fact that higher scrap prices lead to elevated
1Younger vessels in poor condition may also be scrapped earlier than older vessels in good condition, if
the scrapyard appears as a more feasible option than a costly vessel overhaul.
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scrapping activity; while the probability of scrapping increases with age, interest rates, and
freight volatility. Finally, market expectations are key in shipping investment/divestment
decisions under freight income uncertainty (Stopford, 2009) and the application of real op-
tions theory provides shipping companies with valuable flexibility in the decision making
process (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Dikos, 2008; Gkochari, 2015; Kyriakou et al., 2017).
However, vessel ordering and scrapping activity is a strategic decision that, among other
factors, may be the outcome of shipowners revising their own market outlook upon observ-
ing the actions of others, i.e., there is a degree of herd behavior involved. Herd behavior is
generally used to describe trading decisions that are based on the collective actions in a mar-
ket rather than personal beliefs and information (Hwang and Salmon, 2004). This trading
behavior can lead a group of investors to move in the same direction and, as a consequence,
herding can cause asset prices to deviate from their fundamental values (Bikhchandani et al.,
1992; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). Therefore, examining herd behavior may provide an under-
standing of its influence on asset values (Chang et al., 2000). For example, investors might be
interested in the existence of herding, as reliance on common rather than private information
may cause assets to deviate from the fundamental values and present profitable opportunities.
Herding has also attracted the attention of academics because the associated behavioral ef-
fects on asset price movements may affect their risk-return characteristics and, therefore, can
have implications for asset pricing models2. In addition, according to Scharfstein and Stein
(1990), classical economic theory suggests that investment decisions reflect the rationally
formed expectations of agents, i.e., decisions made utilizing all the available information in
an efficient manner; in contrast, investment may also be driven by group psychology (herd
behavior), which weakens the link between information and market outcomes. Our aim is
to provide an understanding of some of the forces that may lead to herd behavior in the
shipping markets. Existing literature on investigating herd behavior is mainly concentrated
on herding between institutional/retail investors (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Sias, 2004;
Kumar and Lee, 2006) or herding towards the market consensus (e.g., Christie and Huang,
1995; Chang et al., 2000). Our paper falls within the latter strand and tests for herding
behavior in the newbuilding and scrap markets of drybulk vessels.
Our main contribution to the ship finance literature is the fact that this paper, to the
best of our knowledge, is the first to examine herd behavior in the shipping industry. To
that end, we first test for overall herd behavior and, then, for unintentional and intentional
herding. To achieve the latter, we augment our herding equation to provide evidence on
whether investors base their decisions on common elements that they share or just mimic
the decisions of few reputable investors due to an informational disadvantage3. Further, we
test for asymmetric herd behavior effects in terms of extreme market movements, contraction
and expansion phases; and whether there are any spill-over herding effects from one market
2In the drybulk market, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and asset pricing models fo-
cus mainly on the term structure of freight rates, vessel price formation, risk premium and trad-
ing strategies (Kavussanos and Alizadeh, 2002; Adland and Koekebakker, 2004; Kavussanos et al., 2004;
Adland and Strandenes, 2006; Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2006; Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2007). However, herd-
ing behavior may not always be regarded as an anomaly which contradicts the efficient market hypothesis;
rather, if it is assumed that investors trade in the direction of informed investors, then asset prices may
converge faster to their fundamental values (Gavriilidis et al., 2013; Economou et al., 2015).
3Only recent studies have concentrated on the issue of intentional and unintentional herding
(Holmes et al., 2013; Galariotis et al., 2015).
3
to another. Finally, we provide additional tests for asymmetric effects based on the notion
of an old and a new generation of shipowners, and extreme risk-return profiles and market
valuation periods.
Furthermore, while the existing literature focuses on financial markets and assets, our
contribution is the examination of herd behavior in a real assets market setting; therefore, we
overcome the problem of using proxies to capture direct real assets investment/divestment.
For example, several studies (see Philippas et al., 2013; Babalos et al., 2015; among others)
examine herd behavior in the real estate market based on Real Estate Investment Trusts (RE-
ITs), as these products represent a good proxy for the real estate market (Hsieh and Peterson,
2000; Zhou and Lai, 2008; Lee and Chiang, 2010) because their assets consist of investments
in real estate.
Overall, our results indicate that shipping investors unintentionally herd in their decision
to contract new and/or scrap older vessels, and we attribute this herd behavior to relative
homogeneity. Moreover, we establish asymmetric herd behavior as unintentional herding
is likely to be encountered only during down markets in both the newbuilding and scrap
markets. This result is complemented by the detection of unintentional herding in the scrap
market, which is more profound during contraction phases. Therefore, we also highlight
the importance of decomposing total herding into unintentional and intentional herding, as
examining only total herding would reveal no asymmetric herd behavior in the two mar-
kets. Next, we show that the scrap market is affected by spill-over herding effects in the
newbuilding market, and this can be attributed to the social interaction (hence, social mood
driving herding) among the participants and the fact that the investment decision to con-
tract a new vessel and/or scrap an old one is taken by the participants who belong in both
markets. Additional tests on asymmetric herd behavior reveal that unintentional herding
when contracting new vessels stems from relative homogeneity in terms of liberal philosophy
towards the ownership of vessels (in addition to possible similar academic backgrounds and
analytical skills); whereas intentional herding exists in the case of the traditional philos-
ophy towards vessel ownership and the contracting of newbuildings. In terms of extreme
risk-return profiles and market valuation periods, we present evidence that investors herd
unintentionally in their decision to scrap vessels during extreme low risk-return profiles and
high market valuation periods. Furthermore, we establish intentional herd behavior during
high risk-return profiles and market valuation in the decision to scrap old and contract new
vessels respectively. Our findings may have theoretical and empirical implications for market
participants and academics alike, as the herding and asymmetric behavioral effects found
need to be taken into account by market participants or theoretical models that attempt to
describe the behavior of agents in the newbuilding and scrap market of the drybulk industry.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses herding, how it is
measured and decomposed into unintentional and intentional. Section 3 provides evidence of
asymmetric herd behavior during extreme market movements, and contraction and expansion
phases. Herding spill-over effects are investigated in Section 4, whereas additional tests for
asymmetric herding effects are conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Herding measurement and detection
The intuition behind the herding measure that follows is that investors may ignore prior
heterogeneous beliefs in order to follow correlated patterns around the aggregate market
behavior (Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang et al., 2000). The empirical tools employed to
examine herd behavior towards market consensus can be broadly classified into two mea-
sures and methods. Christie and Huang (1995) detect herding among investors by the cross-
sectional standard deviation (CSSD) of stock returns, and their empirical approach is based
on rational asset pricing models and herding in periods of market stress. They argue that,
during normal periods, rational asset pricing models predict that the dispersion in cross-
sectional returns increases with the absolute value of market returns, as investors trade on
private and diverse information. On the other hand, during extreme market movements, in-
vestors suppress their private information and mimic collective actions in the market, leading
to lower return dispersions. Therefore, herding is be more prevalent during extreme market
movements, which are defined as the occurrence of extreme returns on the market portfolio.
To differentiate between their assumptions, they isolate the level of dispersion into the lower
and upper tails of the returns distribution and test whether these differ from the average
level of dispersion4. In addition, herding may be examined by the cross-sectional absolute
deviation (CSAD) of stock returns of Chang et al. (2000), where herding is assumed to
be a function of the dispersion measure that is either non-linearly decreasing or reaches a
maximum at a certain threshold level of the expected absolute market return and declines
thereafter. In this paper, we utilize an adjusted5 CSAD to investigate herding in the drybulk
market for vessel contracting and scrapping
CSADϑt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣Iϑi,t − I¯ϑt
∣∣ , ϑ ∈ {C, S}, (1)
where CSADϑt is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C) and scrapping
(ϑ = S) of vessels, Iϑi,t is the number of vessels in the i
th sector (i = capesize, panamax,
handymax, handysize) that are contracted (newbuildings) or scrapped at time t, and I¯ϑt =∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of vessels contracted or scrapped. For the
estimation of CSADϑ we use data provided by Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network for
the period January 1996–May 2015. The evolution of CSADϑ for vessel contracting and
scrapping over time is presented in Figure 1. In general terms, the CSADC measure is
relatively stable with three notable exceptions where deviations from the market consensus
are significantly increasing: the advance of the drybulk market to all-time highs (2007–
2008), and the two periods after the market crash when market participants believed that
the worse was over (2010 and 2013–2014). On the other hand, the CSADS measure moves in
a more erratic way and increasing deviations from the aggregate market behavior are more
frequently observed: the Russian and Asian crises (1996–1999), the dotcom bubble (2000–
4Herding can also take place during normal market periods (Hwang and Salmon, 2004).
5The CSAD measure is adjusted and estimated based on the number of new vessels contracted or older
vessels scrapped rather than the returns on individual assets and the market. In the analysis that follows,
we have also used the CSSD measure to test for herding behavior; our results have remained qualitatively
and quantitatively similar.
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2002), the subprime, financial, and shipping crashes (2008–2009), and the period when the
freight market took another dive after a short-lived upturn (2011–2013).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Next, to detect herding activity in the market, we adopt the non-linear OLS specifica-
tion of Chang et al. (2000) and estimate the relation between the cross-sectional absolute
deviation measure and the overall market average of contracting or scrapping vessels6
CSADϑt = γ0 + γ1
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣ + γ2
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+ υϑt . (2)
Chang et al. (2000) argue that, if investors tend to follow the aggregate market behavior
during periods of large average price movements, then the linear and increasing relation
between dispersion and market return (under rational asset pricing models) no longer holds
and it may become non-linearly increasing or decreasing. The linear part of the above
dependence is picked up by the positive γ1 coefficient, while the non-linear part by γ2. If
γ2 < 0, the cross-sectional deviation of contracting or scrapping increases less than linearly,or
even decreases, in the market average when the latter is large in absolute terms. This is
interpreted as evidence of herd behavior and, as such, the coefficient of the non-linear term
should be negative and statistically significant. Therefore, we assume that, if herd behavior
is encountered in the market for contracting newbuildings or scrapping older vessels, then
γ2 has to be negative and statistically significant.
2.1 Intentional and unintentional herd behavior
Herd behavior can be classified as intentional or unintentional. In the case of intentional
herding, investors mimic each other’s actions with intent. This type of behavior is normally
observed in less sophisticated investors who attempt to copy reputable or well-established
investors, as obtaining the full information of well-established investors would incur high
costs. Generally, intentional herding is characterized by some sort of informational or pro-
fessional asymmetry. From the informational asymmetry perspective, investors may resort
to herding when they have an informational disadvantage; which can be an actual or per-
ceived disadvantage (Devenow and Welch, 1996). Intentional herding can also arise due
to professional asymmetry as a result of ability or reputation. This is often encountered
in financial intermediaries’ or hedge funds’ managers who are assessed periodically; hence,
managers of low ability or reputation may mimic the actions of high ability or reputation
peers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Villatoro, 2009). In contrast, unintentional herding oc-
curs when investors make similar investment decisions as a result of a common element in
their environment (Hirshleifer et al., 1994; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). Common ele-
ments may include relative homogeneity (Teh and de Bondt, 1997) and characteristic trading
(Bennett et al., 2003). Relative homogeneity refers to investors who process the information
or signals (e.g., financial ratios) received in a similar manner due to the fact that they share
6We report the OLS results of the empirical estimation as in Hwang and Salmon (2004),
Chiang and Zheng (2010), Economou et al. (2011) and Galariotis et al. (2015), among others. For robust-
ness purposes, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure has also been used and the results
have remained qualitatively similar.
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similar academic backgrounds or analytical skills (Wermers, 1999), whereas characteristic
trading refers to investment decisions based on specific characteristics of the assets, which
eventually lead to style investing (e.g., growth, income, momentum, industry).
To decompose the CSADϑt measure into intentional and unintentional deviations, we
employ three metrics that adequately capture important shipping information, are similar
to all market participants and may affect the decision to order a new or scrap an old vessel;
however, we recognize the fact that there may be other metrics that drive the investment
decision. The metrics cover key areas of the shipping market and are classified into two
categories: valuation (price-earnings ratio) and market conditions (secondhand-newbuilding
price ratio and Baltic Dry Index). All data required for the calculation of the metrics are
provided by Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network for the period January 1996–May 2015.
The first valuation-specific metric is the price-earnings (PE) ratio for vessels: PEi,t =
P SHi,t −Ei,t, where P
SH
i,t is the log-price of the 5-year old secondhand vessel and Ei,t the log-
earnings (1-year time-charter rates7) in sector i and month t. The PE ratio is used to predict
subsequent asset returns (Campbell and Shiller, 1998; Rangvid, 2006; Alizadeh and Nomikos,
2007) and reflects the relative degree of overvaluation/undervaluation in asset prices. The
estimate of earnings is forward-looking and reflects the expected earnings from operating
the vessel for one year from the point of valuation, i.e., high (low) PE ratios translate to
high (low) current vessel prices relative to the one-year earnings. Papapostolou et al. (2014)
argue that high PE ratios are associated with low investor sentiment levels, which may lead
to higher levels of scrapping and low investment in newbuilding orders. The second metric
is the secondhand-newbuilding price (SNB) ratio which belongs to the market conditions
category: SNBi,t = P
SH
i,t − P
NB
i,t , where P
NB
i,t is the log newbuilding vessel price. Newbuild-
ing vessels have longer useful economic lives than identical secondhand vessels of certain age
(e.g., five or ten-year old vessels), which, in general, means that their cost is also higher.
However, during prosperous freight rate markets, investors prefer to take advantage of the
prevailing conditions immediately and favor the purchase of secondhand vessels to avoid the
construction lag of newbuildings8. This creates an immediate delivery premium which drives
SNB to higher levels. Papapostolou et al. (2014) show that SNB is related to investors’
sentiment in the drybulk market and, as such, we expect that a higher ratio can lead to
more vessel orders and less scrapping. The final metric is the 1-year change on the Baltic
Dry Index (BDI): BDIR,t = BDIt − BDIt−12, where BDIt is the log BDI level in month t.
Similarly to SNB, we expect that higher freight market levels can tempt investors to order
new vessels, with the scrapping of older vessels remaining at a minimum.
To provide support that the metrics contain valuable information that may affect the
decision to order and scrap vessels, we estimate regressions of the type: Iϑt = β0+β1Xt+υ
ϑ
t ;
where Iϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t is the total number of vessels contracted or scrapped and Xt includes
the aggregate metrics PEt, SNBt and the BDIR,t. To calculate the aggregate metrics PEt
7Fixed daily freight rate (US$/day) received by the shipowner for chartering (leasing or letting-out) a
vessel for a 1-year period.
8The building of new vessels is characterized by significant construction lags. The actual construction
time, which ranges on average between 1–3 years, may often be lengthened considerably by the lack of
available berth capacity in shipyards or due to order backlog. For example, Kalouptsidi (2014) quantifies the
impact of time-to-build on shipping investments and estimates that the average construction time almost
doubled in 2001-2008.
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and SNBt for the drybulk market, we assign weights ωi,t to each metric of sector i based on
the market share (in terms of deadweight tonnage) of the sector in the total drybulk fleet:
PEt =
∑
4
i=1 ωi,tPEi,t and SNBt =
∑
4
i=1 ωi,tSNBi,t. The results are provided in Appendix
A.1 and show that the proposed metrics explain a significant variance proportion of the
number of vessels ordered and scrapped. Finally, to distinguish between intentional and
unintentional herding, we run the regression
CSADϑt = β0 + β1Xt + υ
ϑ
t , (3)
and define the intentional herding measure CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t . Then, the unintentional herding
measure is given by the difference between total herding and intentional herding
CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t − CSAD
ϑ,I
t . (4)
Therefore, we can think of the υϑt term as a measure of clustering due to market participants
responding to uncorrelated information, whereas CSADϑ,Ut as a measure of clustering due
to correlated information that is analyzed in a similar manner.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Having decomposed the total herding measure into the unintentional and intentional
measures, we next estimate the benchmark herding model given by Eq. 2. The results are
reported in Table 1 and are grouped into three categories: total herding (CSADϑt ), uninten-
tional herding (CSADϑ,Ut ) and intentional herding (CSAD
ϑ,I
t ). In terms of total herding,
the cross-sectional contracting and scrapping dispersions increase with the magnitude of
the cross-sectional market average number of contracting and scrapping, a feature that is
consistent with rational asset pricing models. Furthermore, we find that herd behavior is
present in both markets, as reflected by the negative and statistically significant value of γˆ2.
The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar in the case of unintentional herding.
On the other hand, there is no evidence of reduced cross-sectional dispersion around the
market average of contracting and scrapping in the case of intentional herding. Therefore,
we conclude that, in the period January 1996–May 2015, shipping investors unintention-
ally herded in their decision to contract new and/or scrap older vessels; we attribute this
herd behavior to relative homogeneity. Specifically, investors reached analogous investment
decisions as a result of sharing a similar academic background and/or equivalent analyt-
ical/technical skills, elements that eventually led to processing the correlated information
received (shipping metrics) in a similar way.
3 Asymmetric herd behavior during up and down mar-
kets, expansion and contraction phases
In this section, we examine whether there is an asymmetric relationship between CSADϑt
and the cross-sectional market average of contracting and scrapping. Christie and Huang
(1995), Chang et al. (2000) and Demirer et al. (2010) show that herding effects are expected
to be more pronounced during periods of market losses. To test whether shipping investors
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react differently during months when the freight market is up compared to months when
the freight market is down, we follow the approach of Chiang and Zheng (2010) who use a
dummy variable approach in a single model expressed by
CSADϑt = γ0 + γ1(1−D
d)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣ + γ2Dd
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ3(1−Dd)
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+ γ4D
d
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+ υϑt , (5)
where Dd = 1 if BDIR,t < 0 (down market), and 0 otherwise (up market).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 reports the estimates of the models for total herding (CSADϑt ), unintentional
herding (CSADϑ,Ut ) and intentional herding (CSAD
ϑ,I
t ) under asymmetric market condi-
tions. Our γˆ3 and γˆ4 coefficients provide consistent evidence with the results presented in
Section 2.1. Particularly, we find a negative sign for the unintentional contracting herding
coefficient regardless of whether the market is up or down, while the results show stronger
herd behavior in months of declining freight rates. In good markets, contracting a newbuild-
ing vessel may seem attractive as higher freight rates due to charterers’ preferences to be
associated with top tonnage may result in newbuildings being first in line for competitive
charter bidding9. The chartering aspect has also been important by enabling newbuilding
transactions to be financially viable through the existence of quality time charter contracts
from “first” class charterers, thereby, providing a degree of security for providers of credit. In
poor markets, newbuildings are also likely to be competitive due to construction lags, which
may prove beneficial to shipping investors contracting for low priced tonnage in depressed
markets and hoping to benefit from an improved market on delivery.
Furthermore, we detect unintentional herd behavior in the scrap market only in down
freight markets, which is consistent with the negative relation between scrapping and market
conditions (Buxton, 1991; Knapp et al., 2008; Alizadeh et al., 2016), i.e., freight conditions
are such that it is not economically feasible to operate vessels. To test the equality of
the herding coefficients between up and down markets, we conduct a Wald test for the
null hypothesis H0: γˆ3 = γˆ4. The chi-square statistics reliably point towards rejection
of the null hypothesis in the case of unintentional herd behavior in both the newbuilding
and scrap markets, confirming the asymmetric herd behavior described above. It is also
interesting to observe that the results of the benchmark total herding model (Table 1) are
reversed, as we do not detect total herd behavior when asymmetric freight market conditions
are considered. Therefore, our results identify: (1) the importance of decomposing total
herding into unintentional and intentional herding, as examining only total herding suggests
no asymmetric herd behavior in any of the two markets, and (2) that unintentional herd
behavior is likely to be encountered in both the newbuilding and scrap markets during down
freight markets.
Next, we test asymmetric herd behavior during contraction and expansion phases in
the newbuilding10 and freight markets. To date the newbuilding vessel prices and earnings
9In practice, time charter contracts may not always be available and, consequently, lead investors with
a speculative bet at or near the top of the market.
10We have also tested for asymmetric herd behavior during contraction/expansion phases in the scrap
market; the results have remained qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
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turning points, we use the non-parametric algorithm of Bry and Boschan (1971) as modified
by Harding and Pagan (2002); the turning points and assumptions made are provided in
Appendix A.2. This method captures the turning points in an efficient way with a mini-
mum set of assumptions which is sufficient for our purposes. For our analysis, we estimate
the turning points on the bulkcarrier newbuilding price index and Clarksea average bulker
earnings index, both provided by Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network. To test whether
shipping investors behave differently during contractions and expansions phases, we follow
the approach of Chiang and Zheng (2010) and use a dummy variable in the herding equation
CSADϑt = γ0+ γ1(1−D
con)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ2Dcon
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ3(1−Dcon)
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+ γ4D
con
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+υϑt , (6)
where Dcon takes value 1 (0) during contraction (expansion) phases in the newbuilding and
earnings markets.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 presents the regression estimates for testing asymmetric herding effects under
newbuilding prices (Panel A) and earnings (Panel B) contraction/expansions phases. The
results of Panel A indicate that total herding is present in both the newbuilding and scrap
markets (consistently with our discussion in Section 2.1) during expansion phases in the
newbuilding market. However, the Wald test for the null hypothesis that the herding coeffi-
cients are equal during contractions and expansions cannot be rejected, hence, the herding
asymmetry found during expansion phases cannot be confirmed. Similar results are observed
in the case of unintentional herding in the newbuilding market, where the Wald test fails to
reject the null hypothesis of herding symmetry during expansion phases, even though γˆ3 is
negative and statistical significant. In contrast, we find evidence of unintentional herding
in the scrap market during contraction phases, as γˆ3 is negative and statistically significant,
and the null hypothesis H0: γˆ3 = γˆ4 is rejected at the 5% significance level according to
the Wald test. In terms of intentional herding, we detect no asymmetric effects in any of
the two markets. Panel B reports the results under the different earnings phases and, in all
cases, we find no evidence of herding asymmetric behavior under contraction or expansion
phases11. Therefore, we conclude that unintentional herding in the scrap market is more
profound during contraction phases in the newbuilding market, which also complements our
results that unintentional herding is stronger during down markets. A possible explanation
of this phenomenon is that contraction periods in the newbuilding market probably indicate
deteriorating overall market conditions; thus, market participants – who analyze the infor-
mation received in a similar manner – may herd in their decision to scrap an older vessel
which may be uneconomical viable to operate.
Finally, we test whether investors revealed any asymmetry in herd behavior during the
Asian/Russian crises, the dotcom collapse and the recent subprime and financial crises (re-
sults are presented in Appendix A.3). The results are in line with the above discussion and
suggest that unintentional herding in the scrapping decision is stronger during crises periods
(Asian/Russian crises and dotcom collapse), although some unintentional herding when con-
tracting new vessels is also detected during the dotcom collapse. When all crises are taken
11We have also identified the turning points based on an aggregate scrap price index; however, the results
showed no asymmetric herd behavior during contraction and expansion phases.
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into account, we detect no asymmetric herding effects and, therefore, the decision to build a
new or scrap an old vessel is generally not affected by the examined crises.
4 Spill-over herding effects
Stopford (2009) categorizes the shipping industry into four separate but interrelated markets:
the newbuilding market, the freight market, the sale and purchase market, and the demolition
market; whereas Wijnolst and Wergeland (1996) offer an alternative classification: the real
market for ships (newbuilding and demolition) and spot freight, and the auxiliary markets
for timecharters and secondhand vessels. In either case, the dynamics of these markets are
closely related as the same investor is trading in all markets. Furthermore, social interaction
and social mood may also be a driving force of herding. Olson (2006) suggests that emotions
are prone to contagion among participants in a group, directly impacting the overall behavior
of the group. In the case of shipping, social interaction enables word of mouth sharing of
information between investors/shipowners within a relatively small and niche market, while
companies normally operate a mixture of young and old vessels across sectors of the drybulk
market. Therefore, in an integrated drybulk market facilitated by efficient information flow
and processing, investment and divestment activities are unlikely to be insulated, especially
when a company has to make a decision on both contracting a new vessel and scrapping an
old one. To take into account the possibility of spill-over herding effects from the newbuilding
to the scrap market, and vice versa, we modify12 the herding specification of Eq. 2 which
assumes a closed system in that no effects from one market to the other are involved, and
estimate
CSADCt = γ0 + γ1
∣∣I¯Ct
∣∣+ γ2
(
I¯Ct
)2
+ γ3
(
I¯St
)2
+ υCt , (7)
CSADSt = γ0 + γ1
∣∣I¯St
∣∣ + γ2
(
I¯St
)2
+ γ3
(
I¯Ct
)2
+ υSt . (8)
All variables are defined in Section 2 and the benchmark herding equation (Eq. 2) is modified
to take into account the fact that participants in the newbuilding (scrap) market may actu-
ally exhibit herd behavior as a response to extreme movements in the scrap (newbuilding)
market13.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 4 presents the regression estimates from testing for possible herding spill-over ef-
fects between the newbuilding and scrap markets. Consistently with our earlier findings,
total and unintentional herd behavior is present in both markets, as reflected by the nega-
tive value and statistical significance of γˆ2. In terms of total and intentional herding, we find
12Whether herd behavior in one market is affected by events taking place in another market has been
previously examined (Klein, 2013). For example, Chiang and Zheng (2010) find that events in the US market
help explain herd behavior in other markets. When testing for herding effects in international markets, prior
studies (Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Economou et al., 2011; Galariotis et al., 2015) have added the return of
the US market as an extra variable in the benchmark model.
13The correlation coefficients between
(
I¯Ct
)2
and
(
I¯St
)2
, I¯Ct and
(
I¯St
)2
, and
(
I¯Ct
)2
and I¯St are -0.127, -0.126
and -0.188 respectively; suggesting no multicollinearity in our Equations 7–8.
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no evidence of spill-over effects. However, in the case of unintentional herding, adding
(
I¯Ct
)2
into Eq. 8 enhances the explanatory power as suggested by the higher adjusted-R2. Fur-
thermore, the negative sign and statistical significance of γˆ3 reveal spill-over herding effects
running from the newbuilding to the scrap market; this is also supported by the rejection of
the null hypothesis H0: γˆ2 = γˆ3 at the 1% significance level. This result can be attributed
to the social interaction (hence, social mood driving herding) among participants and the
fact that the decision to contract a new vessel and scrap an old one is taken by participants
who are active in both markets. Additionally, fleet replacement programmes and scrap-
and-build schemes may also be contributing factors for the spill-over effects found; although
in theory, the scrap-and-build scheme states that scrapping a vessel should take place first
and the order confirmation for a new replacement vessel second. Therefore, when analyzing
herding activity in the shipping industry, one cannot disregard the fact that the different
markets within the industry are integrated. Finally, as spill-over effects in the shipping in-
dustry have been previously established in terms of volatility (Kavussanos, 2003; Chen et al.,
2010; Drobetz et al., 2012; Tsouknidis, 2016), we complement the existing literature from a
different perspective.
5 Additional tests for asymmetric herding effects
5.1 Traditional versus liberal philosophy towards the ownership
of the vessel
As discussed earlier, unintentional herding can be attributed to relative homogeneity, i.e.,
investors processing the information or signals received in a similar manner due to the fact,
for example, that they share similar academic backgrounds or analytical skills. In this
section, we test whether the unintentional herd behavior found in Section 2.1 is indeed an
outcome of relative homogeneity. However, we assume that relative homogeneity refers also
to shipping investors having a more liberal philosophy towards the ownership of the vessel;
this, is manifested by the utilization of less traditional14 sources of finance, such as the
equity and bond capital markets (Grammenos and Papapostolou, 2012). We call shipping
investors who do not pose the common element of liberal philosophy towards the ownership
of the vessel as the traditional generation, whereas investors of relative homogeneity with
respect to the above element as the liberal generation. To distinguish the traditional from the
liberal generation, we split our sample into two sub-periods: January 1996–December 2003
(traditional generation) and January 2004–May 2015 (liberal generation). The categorization
is based on the fact that after 2003, as can be observed in Figure 2, we have experienced
a massive wave of equity and bond offerings in terms of capital raised, which is also an
indication of the liberal philosophy towards the ownership of the vessel. One, of course, has
to take into account the main reasons behind the emergence of the liberal generation: (1) the
drybulk market conditions in 2003–2008 were extremely good due to the Chinese economic
boom and increased demand for seaborne trade; as a result, there was a need for increasing
the size of shipping companies and funds to finance the overall fleet expansion programme,
14Most shipping companies start out by raising capital from the owner’s own funds and the banking
system (Grammenos and Papapostolou, 2012).
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(2) the appetite of investment banks for a fee-generating income by completing equity and
bond offering deals, (3) the temporary difficulty of the banking system in providing on time
the necessary funds in 2009–2013, and (4) the entrance of private equity funds in 2006–2015.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
To test whether any asymmetric herd behavior effects exist in the market due to the
difference between the old and new generation of investors, we employ a dummy variable in
the herding equation
CSADϑt = γ0+γ1(1−D
trad)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ2Dtrad
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ3(1−Dtrad)
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+γ4D
trad
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+υϑt , (9)
where Dtrad = 1 if market participants do not share the common element of liberal phi-
losophy towards the ownership of vessels (traditional generation); and 0 otherwise (liberal
generation).
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Table 5 reports the results from testing herding activity between the traditional and lib-
eral generation of shipping investors. We find unintentional herd behavior in the contracting
decision of the liberal generation of investors, which is in line with our argument that this is a
group of investors who share similar academic backgrounds, analytical skills and philosophy
towards the ownership of the vessel (negative sign and statistical significance of γˆ3 coeffi-
cient, supported by the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: γˆ2 = γˆ3 at the 1% significance
level). In terms of the decision to scrap, there is no clear evidence of asymmetric effects
for unintentional herd behavior between the traditional and liberal generation as both γˆ3
and γˆ4 are statistically negative and different according to the Wald test; however, herding
is stronger in the case of the traditional generation of investors. Therefore, we conclude
that unintentional herding in the contracting of vessels stems from relative homogeneity in
terms of, not only similar academic background/skills, but also liberal philosophy towards
the ownership of vessels.
Furthermore, our results support asymmetric effects in intentional herd behavior of the
traditional generation when deciding to contract new vessels and reiterate the definition of
intentional herding that is characterized by informational or professional asymmetry. The
traditional philosophy towards the ownership of the vessel normally dictated high degree of
commitment by shipowners to the vessel/company due to the high risk and cost involved
in newbuilding orders. Consequently, contractors of new tonnage were usually established
market players with a view to employing the vessel for its full economic life. For that reason,
and the fact that the sophistication of the shipping industry and the tools employed to assist
the decision to order a new vessel were in scarcity prior to 2004, investors probably mimicked
a few reputable and major investors in the market in an effort to reduce their informational
disadvantage without losing their market share.
13
5.2 Asymmetric effects under extreme risk-return profiles and
market valuation periods
Next, we examine whether herd behavior differs during extreme risk-return profiles and mar-
ket valuation periods. Christie and Huang (1995) suggest that herding dominates during pe-
riods of market stress, whereas Gleason et al. (2004) and Tan et al. (2008) argue that herding
effects are stronger during periods of high volatility. To detect possible asymmetric herd be-
havior under extreme market returns and volatility, we calculate the Sharpe ratio (SR) to rep-
resent the risk-return profile of the drybulk market: SRi,t =
∑t
s=t−M+1∆Ei,t/
√∑t
s=t−M+1∆E
2
i,t,
where
∑t
s=t−M+1∆Ei,t is the one-year realized return and
√∑t
s=t−M+1∆E
2
i,t the one-year
realized volatility of BDI. To calculate the aggregate SR metric for the drybulk market,
we assign weights ωi,t on the metric of sector i as in Section 2.1. Furthermore, we check
for asymmetric herding effects during periods of extreme valuations in the market, i.e., test
whether there is any difference in herd behavior at extreme values in terms of the PE metric
of Section 2.1. In our analysis, we assume that herd behavior should be more prevalent: (1)
during periods of extreme SR values, as the return on investment is either extremely high
or low compared to the associated risk; (2) during extreme PE values, as secondhand vessel
prices are extremely high or low compared to the corresponding earnings. To detect any
asymmetric effects, we use a dummy variable in the following herding equation
CSADϑt = γ0 + γ1D
U
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ2DL
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣ + γ3DU
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+ γ4D
L
(
I¯ϑt
)2
+ υϑt , (10)
where DU (DL) equals 1 if SR, PE are in the upper (lower) α-quantile15 of the distribution
with α = 0.10.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Table 6 presents the estimates of the herding specification in Eq. 10. In terms of extreme
SR profiles (Panel A), the results indicate that unintentional herding is present in the scrap
market during extreme low SR periods and the Wald test for the null hypothesis that the
herding coefficients – between extreme high and low periods – are equal can be rejected, con-
firming the herding asymmetry. Similar results are observed in the case of intentional herding
in the scrap market, however during extreme high SR profiles; with γˆ3 found negative and
statistically significant and the null hypothesis H0: γˆ3 = γˆ4 rejected at the 5% significance
level according to the Wald test. The fact that investors herd unintentionally in their deci-
sion to scrap vessels during extreme low SR periods comes as no surprise. Indeed, one would
expect well-informed investors, who analyze information in a similar manner, to scrap vessels
as it is deemed uneconomical to operate them when the return on investment is substantially
low compared to the associated risk – especially when at the extreme low profiles a negative
return on investment is observed (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the intentional herding during
high SR periods may be attributed to investors mimicking a few reputable ones who may
wish to scrap vessels before a downturn in the market materializes according to their expec-
tations. Another possibility is the clustering of scrapping activity which, in the long run,
15We have also tested for α = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10. Here, we present results only for α = 0.10 as this is the
level at which asymmetric herding effects are found.
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can be a reflection of increased vessel deliveries (Zannetos, 1966) and, subsequently, an at-
tempt to relieve an oversupplied market (see Figure 3). However, the clustering of scrapping
activity may also be the outcome of practical delays in the scrapping of vessels or simply a
case of lagged demolition reporting into the public domain (Adland and Strandenes, 2007).
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Panel B reports the results under extreme PE periods, where evidence of asymmetric
herd behavior is found only during periods of extreme high PE periods. Specifically, γˆ3 is
negative and statistically significant in the cases of unintentional and intentional herding in
the scrapping and contracting decisions, respectively. In both cases, the herding asymmetry
is further confirmed by the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: γˆ3 = γˆ4 at the 1% significance
level. Therefore, we conclude that unintentional herding exists in the scrap market when
vessels values are at extreme levels compared to their expected earnings. As such, informed
investors may scrap old vessels to achieve better prices in anticipation of a drop in asset
values to reflect the earnings in the market. This can also be linked to investors’ unintentional
herd behavior in their decision to scrap during extreme low risk-return profiles as it is not
economically feasible to operate vessels (see Figure 3). Finally, investors herd intentionally
when contracting new vessels during extremely high PE periods, and as Figure 3 suggests,
ordering new vessels during an oversupplied market is driven by unsophisticated investors
who incorrectly inflate the orderbook in their attempt to follow reputable investors ordering
new vessels. From the reputable investors’ viewpoint, contracting of newbuildings during
extreme high PE periods can be related to increasing market share and the benefit of
construction lags in anticipation of improved market conditions. On the other hand, from
the unsophisticated investors’ viewpoint, revising own opinions about the future prospects
of the market upon observing the actions of others (informational disadvantage) and fear of
losing market share, may eventually lead to intentional herding in ordering new vessels.
6 Conclusions
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining and providing original evidence on
herd behavior in the shipping industry. We detect unintentional herding in the decision
to contract new and/or scrap older drybulk vessels, suggesting that investors herd due to
common elements they share and not because they mimic the decisions of established and
reputable investors.
In terms of up and down freight markets, we find no clear evidence of asymmetric effects
in unintentional herd behavior when contracting new vessels, although herding is stronger
during down markets. On the other hand, the results show strong unintentional herding when
scrapping vessels during down markets. Hence, we confirm – from a different perspective
– the negative relation between scrapping and market conditions already established in the
literature. Furthermore, it is evident that the different cycle phases of the market do play a
significant role in herd behavior, as herding exists when scrapping vessels during contraction
phases. Given the herding spill-over effects found from the newbuilding to the scrap market,
we argue that herding in the scrap market is affected by herding in the newbuilding market
and add to the current shipping literature on spill-over effects in terms of herding rather
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than volatility. Therefore, when examining herding, one has to take into account the fact
that the two markets are integrated.
Additional tests on asymmetric herding effects reveal that unintentional herding in the
decision to contract a new vessel is based on relative homogeneity in terms of liberal phi-
losophy towards the ownership of the vessel. At the same time, the traditional generation
seems to mimic the decision of few established and reputable investors when scrapping old
vessels, as intentional herding is detected. Furthermore, extreme low risk-return profiles and
high market valuation periods affect herd behavior differently.
The decision to expand or retire fleet capacity plays a key role in shipping invest-
ment/divestment and has an impact on not only the shipping company, but also on the
development of the shipping market. Our results may be of interest to decision-makers –
investors, providers of capital, agencies, and regulators – overseeing the development of the
shipping industry. For example, knowing that herding exists in the capacity expansion or
retirement decision may assist in shaping shipping strategies that are necessary to be suc-
cessful in a competitive environment. Furthermore, the agencies responsible for controlling
the capacity of the market or capital providers who may unintentionally contribute to the
oversupply of vessels may take into account the herding effects and stipulate economic and
financial policies that promote development in the industry without creating supply and
demand imbalances. This paper focuses on the existence of herd behavior among shipping
investors rather than on the design of optimal investment/divestment strategies and effi-
cient policies. Modelling and incorporating herding in the aforementioned decisions and
policies can be a direction of further research. For example, agents have a (real) option to
invest/divest at a time of their choice. However, each agent’s optimal option exercise strat-
egy will be contingent on not only own signals, but on the observed actions of other agents
as well. Therefore, given imperfect information, if an informational cascade occurs, then
agents might start exercising their options sequentially based on positive or negative signals
received. Finally, we do not focus on factors that are an indispensable part of the operating
capacity level, such as, the size of the company and the chartering policy, or the type of
market operating in. Certainly, the different economic and microstructure characteristics of
the above areas will have an asymmetric impact on herd behavior, and this can be another
possible path for future research.
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Table 1: Herding behavior in the drybulk market
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1 and γˆ2) for the regression model
CSADϑt = γ0+γ1
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ2(I¯ϑt )2+υϑt (Eq. 2). CSADϑt is the cross-sectional absolute deviation
of contracting (ϑ = C) and scrapping (ϑ = S) of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1
Iϑi,t/4 is the cross-
sectional average number of vessels contracted or scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the
residuals of Eq. 3, is the intentional herding measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t − CSAD
ϑ,I
t
the unintentional herding measure. The sample period is January 1996–May 2015. Newey–
West t-statistics (with a lag of 12) are reported in (·). Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 R¯
2
Total
CSADCt 0.8206
b 0.3994a -0.0019a 0.610
(0.4102) (0.0684) (0.0006)
CSADSt 0.2615
c 0.5496a -0.0151c 0.735
(0.1471) (0.0976) (0.0089)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.8842
a 0.2311a -0.0018a 0.558
(0.7238) (0.0497) (0.0005)
CSADS,Ut 0.8364
a 0.4260a -0.0168a 0.598
(0.2886) (0.0776) (0.0043)
Intentional
CSADC,It -2.0829
c 0.1688 -0.0002 0.218
(1.0559) (0.1196) (0.0011)
CSADS,It -0.5808 0.1252 0.0016 0.211
(0.3804) (0.1502) (0.0121)
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Table 2: Herding behavior under up and down market states
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3 and γˆ4) for the regression
model CSADϑt = γ0 + γ1(1−D
d)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ2Dd
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ3(1−Dd)(I¯ϑt )2 + γ4Dd(I¯ϑt )2 + υϑt (Eq.
5). CSADϑt is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C) and scrapping
(ϑ = S) of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of vessels contracted
or scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the residuals of Eq. 3, is the intentional herding
measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t − CSAD
ϑ,I
t . D
d = 1 if BDIR,t < 0, and 0 otherwise,
the unintentional herding measure. The sample period is January 1996–May 2015. Newey–
West t-statistics (with a lag of 12) are reported in (·). Chi-square statistics of the Wald test
imposing the restriction γˆ3 = γˆ4 are reported in [·]. Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
Panel A: Total
CSADCt 1.4842
a 0.3197a 0.1843b -0.0010 0.0082a 0.649 [17.711]a
(0.4758) (0.0803) (0.0887) (0.0009) (0.0028)
CSADSt 0.2398
b 0.6008a 0.5578a -0.0254a -0.0152 0.734 [0.534]
(0.1098) (0.0784) (0.0845) (0.0079) (0.0093)
Panel B: Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.7471
a 0.2807a 0.2668a -0.0025a -0.0055a 0.625 [4.390]b
(0.8125) (0.0489) (0.0659) (0.0006) (0.0014)
CSADS,Ut 0.9211
a 0.2679b 0.4814a -0.0079 -0.0214a 0.647 [2.875]c
(0.3002) (0.1045) (0.0818) (0.0096) (0.0036)
Panel C: Intentional
CSADC,It -1.3659 0.0469 -0.0674 0.0014 0.0133
a 0.368 [24.615]a
(0.9628) (0.1143) (0.1149) (0.0013) (0.0031)
CSADS,It -0.6977
b 0.3403b 0.0811 -0.0180 0.0059 0.247 [2.342]
(0.3153) (0.1349) (0.1361) (0.0126) (0.0112)
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Table 3: Herding behavior during expansion and contraction phases
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3 and γˆ4) for the regression
model CSADϑt = γ0+ γ1(1−D
con)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ2Dcon
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+ γ3(1−Dcon)(I¯ϑt )2+ γ4Dcon(I¯ϑt )2+ υϑt
(Eq. 6). CSADϑt is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C) and
scrapping (ϑ = S) of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of
vessels contracted or scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the residuals of Eq. 3, is the
intentional herding measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t −CSAD
ϑ,I
t the unintentional herding
measure. Dcon = 1 (0) during contraction (expansion) phases. The sample period is January
1996–May 2015. Newey–West t-statistics (with a lag of 12) are reported in (·). Chi-square
statistics of the Wald test imposing the restriction γˆ3 = γˆ4 are reported in [·]. Superscripts
a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
Panel A: Newbuilding phases
Total
CSADCt 0.9262
c 0.4009a 0.3524a -0.0021a -0.0006 0.607 [1.204]
(0.5034) (0.0816) (0.0978) (0.0008) (0.0016)
CSADSt 0.2381 0.5816
a 0.5552a -0.0215b -0.0141 0.739 [0.550]
(0.1449) (0.1221) (0.1103) (0.0095) (0.0112)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.8638
a 0.2313a 0.2435b -0.0017a -0.0026 0.557 [0.494]
(0.8770) (0.0501) (0.0938) (0.0005) (0.0016)
CSADS,Ut 0.9084
a 0.3023a 0.4636a -0.0082 -0.0019a 0.622 [5.489]b
(0.3092) (0.0974) (0.0730) (0.0066) (0.0032)
Intentional
CSADC,It -1.9642 0.1700 0.1127 -0.0003 0.0019 0.214 [1.077]
(1.4068) (0.1417) (0.1694) (0.0014) (0.0032)
CSADS,It -0.6762
c 0.2807c 0.0932 -0.0134 0.0056 0.229 [5.800]b
(0.3589) (0.1490) (0.1444) (0.0110) (0.0120)
Panel B: Earnings phases
Total
CSADCt 0.6434
a 0.4598a 0.4082a -0.0041c -0.0014c 0.619 [0.941]
(0.2346) (0.0473) (0.0657) (0.0022) (0.0007)
CSADSt 0.2812
b 0.5271a 0.5183a -0.0066 -0.0137 0.743 [1.266]
(0.1230) (0.0731) (0.1091) (0.0073) (0.0102)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.8988
a 0.2074a 0.2491a -0.0012c -0.0022a 0.558 [1.626]
(0.6579) (0.0455) (0.0651) (0.0007) (0.0006)
CSADS,Ut 0.8529
a 0.4029a 0.4154a -0.0118 -0.0165a 0.599 [0.163]
(0.2723) (0.0935) (0.0808) (0.0107) (0.0050)
Intentional
CSADC,It -2.2752
a 0.2546a 0.1583 -0.0029 0.0008 0.231 [1.786]
(0.8455) (0.0613) (0.1284) (0.0021) (0.0011)
CSADS,It -0.5785
c 0.1271 0.1043 0.0049 0.0027 0.211 [0.044]
(0.3291) (0.1066) (0.1409) (0.0085) (0.0114)
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Table 4: Herding contagion
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2 and γˆ3) for the regression models
CSADCt = γ0+γ1
∣∣I¯Ct
∣∣+γ2(I¯Ct )2+γ3(I¯St )2+υCt (Eq. 7) and CSADSt = γ0+γ1
∣∣I¯St
∣∣+γ2(I¯St )2+
γ3(I¯
C
t )
2+υSt (Eq. 8). CSAD
ϑ
t is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C)
and scrapping (ϑ = S) of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of
vessels contracted or scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the residuals of Eq. 3, is the
intentional herding measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t −CSAD
ϑ,I
t the unintentional herding
measure. The sample period is January 1996–May 2015. Newey–West t-statistics (with a
lag of 12) are reported in (·). Chi-square statistics of the Wald test imposing the restriction
γˆ2 = γˆ3 are reported in [·]. Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 R¯
2 Wald test
Panel A: Total
CSADCt 0.6674
c 0.4003a -0.0019a 0.0043 0.610 [4.576]b
(0.3923) (0.0642) (0.0006) (0.0029)
CSADSt 0.3111 0.5407
a -0.0146b -0.0001 0.735 [3.065]c
(0.1958) (0.1076) (0.0071) (0.0001)
Panel B: Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 3.0035
a 0.2305a -0.0018a -0.0033 0.560 [4.101]b
(0.7405) (0.0461) (0.0005) (0.0072)
CSADS,Ut 1.1222
a 0.3741a -0.0139a -0.0005a 0.675 [10.888]a
(0.2477) (0.0627) (0.0040) (0.0001)
Panel C: Intentional
CSADC,It -2.3636
b 0.1704 -0.0001 0.0078 0.222 [0.743]
(1.1271) (0.1118) (0.0010) (0.0094)
CSADS,It -0.8180
b 0.1683 -0.0008 0.0004a 0.257 [0.013]
(0.3579) (0.1278) (0.0104) (0.0001)
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Table 5: Herding behavior: traditional versus liberal philosophy
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3 and γˆ4) for the regression
model CSADϑt = γ0+γ1(1−D
trad)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ2Dtrad
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ3(1−Dtrad)(I¯ϑt )2+γ4Dtrad(I¯ϑt )2+υϑt
(Eq. 9). CSADϑt is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C) and
scrapping (ϑ = S) of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of
vessels contracted or scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the residuals of Eq. 3, is the
intentional herding measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t −CSAD
ϑ,I
t the unintentional herding
measure. Dold = 1 (0) if market participants belong to the traditional (liberal) philosophy.
The sample period is January 1996–May 2015. Newey–West t-statistics (with a lag of 12)
are reported in (·). Chi-square statistics of the Wald test imposing the restriction γˆ3 = γˆ4
are reported in [·]. Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
Panel A: Total
CSADCt 0.6340 0.4147
a 0.5309a -0.0022a -0.0135 0.607 [1.573]
(0.4938) (0.0784) (0.1562) (0.0008) (0.0095)
CSADSt 0.2298
c 0.5248a 0.6106a -0.0129 -0.0221 0.734 [0.201]
(0.1193) (0.1270) (0.1501) (0.0107) (0.0213)
Panel B: Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 3.6913
a 0.2017a -0.1514 -0.0016a 0.0144 0.618 [3.366]c
(0.5379) (0.0527) (0.1533) (0.0006) (0.0090)
CSADS,Ut 0.7279
b 0.3886a 0.6433a -0.0128a -0.0489a 0.622 [4.664]b
(0.2981) (0.0761) (0.1523) (0.0043) (0.0175)
Panel C: Intentional
CSADC,It -3.0413
a 0.2117c 0.6639a -0.0006 -0.0267c 0.235 [3.891]b
(0.8896) (0.1150) (0.2399) (0.0011) (0.0139)
CSADS,It -0.5038 0.1378 -0.0317 -0.0001 0.0268 0.215 [1.213]
(0.3735) (0.1632) (0.2391) (0.0132) (0.0289)
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Table 6: Herding behavior under extreme risk-return profiles and market valuation states
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3 and γˆ4) for the regression
model CSADϑt = γ0+γ1D
U
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ2DL
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ3DU(I¯ϑt )2+γ4DL(I¯ϑt )2+υϑt (Eq. 10). CSADϑt
is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C) and scrapping (ϑ = S)
of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of vessels contracted or
scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the residuals of Eq. 3, is the intentional herding
measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t −CSAD
ϑ,I
t the unintentional herding measure. D
U (DL)
equals 1 if SR, PE are in the upper (lower) α-quantile of the distribution with α = 0.10.
The sample period is January 1996–May 2015. Newey–West t-statistics (with a lag of 12)
are reported in (·). Chi-square statistics of the Wald test imposing the restriction γˆ3 = γˆ4
are reported in [·]. Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
Panel A: SR extreme state
Total
CSADCt 4.1285
a 0.1079b -0.2329c 0.0021c 0.0158a 0.336 [18.500]a
(0.9272) (0.0535) (0.1199) (0.0012) (0.0034)
CSADSt 1.5609
a 0.0076 0.1984c 0.0182 0.0053 0.340 [0.186]
(0.5553) (0.2615) (0.1101) (0.0239) (0.0113)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 4.3718
a 0.1568a -0.0062 -0.0007 0.0006 0.426 [0.093]
(1.0099) (0.0472) (0.1524) (0.0009) (0.0036)
CSADS,Ut 1.8479
a -0.3533a 0.2567b 0.0539a -0.0088b 0.384 [30.788]a
(0.4600) (0.1348) (0.1106) (0.0120) (0.0044)
Intentional
CSADC,It -0.2626 -0.0475 -0.2232
b 0.0028b 0.0151a 0.119 [20.907]a
(0.5640) (0.0523) (0.0988) (0.0012) (0.0033)
CSADS,It -0.2834 0.3588
a -0.0592 -0.0355b 0.0142 0.146 [6.487]b
(0.1942) (0.1247) (0.0897) (0.0147) (0.0095)
Panel B: PE extreme state
Total
CSADCt 4.9113
a -0.1825 -0.0675 0.0161a 0.0047a 0.127 [16.764]a
(0.9295) (0.1303) (0.0821) (0.0036) (0.0009)
CSADSt 1.9414
a 0.1221 -4.7020a 0.0081 2.1669a 0.307 [19.356]a
(0.3288) (0.2614) (1.0739) (0.0253) (0.4814)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 4.9600
a 0.0329 0.1696b -0.0012 -0.0010 0.125 [0.000]
(0.9571) (0.2827) (0.0764) (0.0083) (0.0012)
CSADS,Ut 2.0567
a 0.2616a -5.4579a -0.0101a 2.4252a 0.364 [33.588]a
(0.2651) (0.0658) (0.8188) (0.0023) (0.4200)
Intentional
CSADC,It -0.0559 -0.2141
b -0.2365b -0.0172a 0.0058a 0.102 [11.286]a
(0.4434) (0.0985) (0.1042) (0.0030) (0.0013)
CSADS,It -0.1110 -0.1403 0.7432 0.0182 -0.2527 0.085 [1.013]
(0.1931) (0.3812) (0.5367) (0.0328) (0.2538)
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Figure 1: Cross Sectional Absolute Deviation (CSAD) for contracting and scrapping
vessels in the drybulk market (1996–2015).
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Figure 2: Amount raised (in US$M) by shipping companies (1996–2014): equity and bond
offerings. Source: Dealogic, Thomson Reuters and Offering Prospecti.
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Figure 3: Baltic Dry Index (BDI), extreme periods of SR and PE.
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Supplementary Appendices
A.1 Shipping metrics, contracting and scrapping
Table A.1: Shipping metrics, contracting and scrapping
The table reports the OLS etimates (denoted by βˆ0, βˆ1, βˆ2 and βˆ3) for the regression model
Iϑt = β0+β1Xt+υ
ϑ
t , where I
ϑ
t is the total number of vessels contracted (ϑ = C) or scrapped
(ϑ = S) and Xt includes the aggregate price-earnings ratio PE, secondhand-newbuilding
ratio SNB and the 1-year BDI change BDIR. The sample period is January 1996–May
2015. All variables are stationary according to the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test
at the 10% significance level or better. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicates no
multicollinearity (multicol.) issues. Newey–West t-statistics (with a lag of 12) are reported
in (·). Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
βˆ0 βˆ1 βˆ2 βˆ3 R¯
2
Panel A: Contracting
ICt -173.155
a 10.168c 191.269a 19.193b 0.497
(41.769) (5.312) (21.843) (8.459)
Panel B: Scrapping
ISt -30.638
b 7.243a -7.943c -4.607a 0.582
(11.923) (1.767) (4.629) (1.442)
Panel C: Unit Root & Multicol. Tests ICt I
S
t PE SNB BDIR
ADF t-statistic -3.719a -2.833c -3.017b -3.224b -3.845a
VIF 1.740 1.611 1.359
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A.2 Turnings points for vessels prices and earnings
The key assumptions made, when using the non-parametric algorithm of Bry and Boschan
(1971) as modified by Harding and Pagan (2002), to determine the turning points are: a) an
initial peak (trough) located at the highest (lowest) point in the vessel price/earnings series
using a window of 5 months on either side of that point; b) a peak (trough) followed by
a trough (peak); c) a cycle (defined as peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough) with a minimum
duration of 18 months; d) a phase (defined as peak-to-trough or trough-to-peak) with a
minimum duration of 5 months; and e) turning points not determined within the first or
last 5 months of the vessel price/earnings series. To identify the turning points, we use data
on the bulkcarrier newbuilding price index from January 1980–May 2015 and the Clarksea
average bulker earning index from January 1990–May 2015 (both indices are provided by
Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network). Here, we report only the turning points that
correspond to our sample period January 1996–May 2015.
Table A.2: Turning points timeline
Newbuilding prices turning points
Capesize Panamax Handymax Handysize Drybulk
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1995:08 1997:03 1995:08 1997:01 1995:08 1999:04 1995:08 1999:04 1996:10 1999:05
1997:10 1999:04 1997:10 1999:04 2000:07 2002:02 2000:03 2002:02 2001:02 2002:04
2001:03 2002:08 2000:10 2002:03 2005:05 2006:04 2005:07 2006:04 2005:05 2006:02
2005:05 2006:02 2005:05 2006:04 2008:08 2010:01 2008:09 2013:04 2008:09 2010:01
2008:08 2013:02 2008:08 2009:10 2010:07 2013:03 2014:07 2011:01 2012:08
2014:05 2011:02 2013:06 2014:07 2014:05
2014:07
Earnings turning points
Capesize Panamax Handymax Handysize Drybulk
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
1995:01 1996:11 1995:05 1996:09 1995:08 1996:10 1995:05 1996:10 1995:05 1996:09
1997:09 1999:04 1997:03 1999:01 1997:10 1999:03 1997:04 1999:02 1997:03 1999:02
2000:09 2002:01 2000:09 2001:11 2000:10 2001:12 2000:10 2001:11 2000:10 2001:12
2004:12 2006:05 2004:03 2006:02 2004:02 2006:02 2005:03 2006:02 2004:12 2006:01
2007:11 2008:11 2008:06 2008:12 2007:11 2008:12 2008:06 2008:12 2007:11 2008:12
2009:06 2012:08 2010:05 2012:09 2010:05 2012:11 2010:05 2013:02 2010:05 2013:02
2014:03 2014:02 2014:03 2014:03 2013:12
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A.3 Herd behavior and market crises
Table A.3: Herding behavior under the Asian, Russian, subprime/financial crises and dotcom
bubble
The table reports the OLS estimates (denoted by γˆ0, γˆ1, γˆ2, γˆ3 and γˆ4) for the regression
model CSADϑt = γ0+γ1(1−D
crisis)
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ2Dcrisis
∣∣I¯ϑt
∣∣+γ3(1−Dcrisis)(I¯ϑt )2+γ4Dcrisis(I¯ϑt )2+
υϑt . CSAD
ϑ
t is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of contracting (ϑ = C) and scrapping
(ϑ = S) of vessels; I¯ϑt =
∑
4
i=1 I
ϑ
i,t/4 is the cross-sectional average number of vessels contracted
or scrapped. CSADϑ,It = υ
ϑ
t , where υ
ϑ
t are the residuals of Eq. 3, is the intentional herding
measure and CSADϑ,Ut = CSAD
ϑ
t − CSAD
ϑ,I
t the unintentional herding measure. D
crisis
equals 1 if the period corresponds to one of the following crises: Asian and Russian crises
from July 1997 to March 1998 and August 1998 to March 1999, respectively; dotcom collapse
from March 2000 to October 2002; subprime and financial crises from August 2007 to March
2009. The sample period is January 1996–May 2015. Newey–West t-statistics (with a lag
of 12) are reported in (·). Chi-square statistics of the Wald test imposing the restriction
γˆ3 = γˆ4 are reported in [·]. Superscripts a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
Asian/Russian crises
Total
CSADCt 0.8237
c 0.4006a 0.5523a -0.0020a -0.0379c 0.607 [3.195]c
(0.4267) (0.0701) (0.2101) (0.0007) (0.0206)
CSADSt 0.2669 0.5560
a 0.3712a -0.0157 0.0109 0.734 [3.060]a
(0.1618) (0.1120) (0.1236) (0.0096) (0.0158)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.9290
a 0.2269a -0.0702 -0.0017a 0.0448 0.556 [0.444]
(0.8655) (0.0597) (0.6279) (0.0006) (0.0703)
CSADS,Ut 0.8270
a 0.4159a 0.7229a -0.0158a -0.0603a 0.606 [29.365]a
(0.2862) (0.0790) (0.1163) (0.0043) (0.0103)
Intentional
CSADC,It -2.1272
c 0.1743 0.6328 -0.0003 -0.0837 0.213 [1.704]
(1.2414) (0.1239) (0.6340) (0.0012) (0.0647)
CSADS,It -0.5659 0.1416 -0.3494
c 0.0001 0.0710a 0.230 [16.896]a
(0.3820) (0.1572) (0.1907) (0.0125) (0.0203)
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Table A.3 continued
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
Dotcom collapse
Total
CSADCt 0.7530 0.4065
a 0.5986a -0.0021a -0.0296c 0.607 [3.472]c
(0.4625) (0.0730) (0.1816) (0.0007) (0.0152)
CSADSt 0.2252
c 0.5346a 0.7854a -0.0136 -0.0486a 0.740 [16.413]a
(0.1223) (0.0939) (0.0698) (0.0087) (0.0098)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 3.4192
a 0.1995a -0.5576a -0.0014a 0.0537a 0.624 [14.539]a
(0.4694) (0.0455) (0.2063) (0.0005) (0.0148)
CSADS,Ut 0.8114
a 0.4311a 0.5942a -0.0169a -0.0533b 0.601 [2.703]c
(0.3087) (0.0775) (0.1982) (0.0044) (0.0229)
Intentional
CSADC,It -2.6914
a 0.2078c 1.1658a -0.0007 -0.0840a 0.238 [9.961]a
(0.8671) (0.1089) (0.3721) (0.0010) (0.0272)
CSADS,It -0.5930 0.1052 0.1946 0.0032 0.0044 0.215 [0.005]
(0.3951) (0.1476) (0.2209) (0.0119) (0.0227)
Subprime/financial crises
Total
CSADCt 0.4915 0.4683
a 0.1558a -0.0027 0.0018c 0.653 [2.790]c
(0.2978) (0.0779) (0.0237) (0.0026) (0.0004)
CSADSt 0.1815 0.6234
a 0.4285a -0.0237b 0.0089a 0.790 [16.482]a
(0.1455) (0.1332) (0.0448) (0.0101) (0.0023)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.8053
a 0.2498a 0.3048a -0.0028a -0.0025a 0.592 [0.093]
(0.6558) (0.0423) (0.0410) (0.0006) (0.0005)
CSADS,Ut 0.8059
a 0.4537a 0.3902a -0.0200a -0.0083 0.612 [3.133]c
(0.3008) (0.0984) (0.1013) (0.0064) (0.0058)
Intentional
CSADC,It -2.3306
a 0.2186a -0.1481a 0.0001 0.0044a 0.334 [1.997]
(0.7694) (0.0765) (0.0559) (0.0027) (0.0008)
CSADS,It -0.6308
c 0.1714 0.0402 -0.0038 0.0172 0.247 [6.236]b
(0.3212) (0.1093) (0.0988) (0.0077) (0.0056)
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Table A.3 continued
γˆ0 γˆ1 γˆ2 γˆ3 γˆ4 R¯
2 Wald test
All crises
Total
CSADCt 0.9833
a 0.4186a 0.1869a -0.0018 0.0011 0.647 [0.873]
(0.2994) (0.0657) (0.0441) (0.0023) (0.0009)
CSADSt 0.2204 0.5979
a 0.4955a -0.0218b 0.0028 0.784 [4.135]b
(0.1428) (0.1470) (0.0745) (0.0114) (0.0059)
Unintentional
CSADC,Ut 2.6652
a 0.2921a 0.2328a -0.0037a -0.0011 0.591 [3.565]c
(0.6174) (0.0534) (0.0689) (0.0008) (0.0012)
CSADS,Ut 0.8217
a 0.4308a 0.4310a -0.0180a -0.0127b 0.607 [1.254]
(0.3041) (0.0936) (0.0961) (0.0058) (0.0051)
Intentional
CSADC,It -1.6982 0.1264 -0.0445 0.0020 0.0022 0.296 [0.002]
(1.1527) (0.1030) (0.1340) (0.0024) (0.0025)
CSADS,It -0.6074
b 0.1686 0.0664 -0.0039 0.0154c 0.251 [3.920]b
(0.2815) (0.1248) (0.1293) (0.0094) (0.0086)
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